In this paper we question one of the paradigms in the behavioural sciences in the last century. We call it the "rationality" paradigm, according to which animal and human behaviour can be understood from the assumption that it is "rational" with respect to reaching a given goal. For instance, animals are assumed to take the best course of action for maximising their reproductive success, and actors in an economic game are assumed to maximise their profit. This kind of reasoning is strongest is evolutionary biology and game theory, but the broader notion that behaviour has a "meaning" is widespread in the social sciences as well. We argue that both empirical and theoretical studies of the evolution of communication question the rationality paradigm, and strongly suggest that whenever organisms interact in conflict situations behaviour strategies will evolve that cannot be fully understood as rational.
In both biology and human culture spectacular phenomena occur when individuals interact, ranging form the diversity of animal sounds in a tropical forest and the beauty of a flower meadow to baroque music and football games. Some recent studies suggest that these phenomena are at odds with one of the dominant paradigms of the behavioural sciences in the last century. We call it the "rationality paradigm". According to this view, all behaviour can be explained by assuming that individuals make decisions consistently in pursuit of a goal. For instance, animals are expected to behave in ways that maximise lifetime reproductive success, and human players in an economic game are expected to act in ways that maximise profit. This kind of thinking is now such a deeply engrained habit, that almost every trait and behaviour is perceived as having a particular meaning or function in terms of maximising something. Faced with signals and communication we expect rational explanations for both the signal itself and the responses it elicits.
In subjects, such as biology and economics the study of rational behaviour has been formalised mathematically in terms of optimisation theory (DeGroot 1970; Alexander 1982; Stephens & Krebs 1986 ) and game theory (Maynard Smith 1982; Fudenberg & Tirole 1992) . In other disciplines a much looser notion prevails, that behaviour has some "ultimate purpose" or "meaning". Examples of this are the explanations offered by anthropologists for the "meaning" of human rituals and symbols (Des Chene 1996) .
The acceptance of the rationality paradigm has been reinforced by arguments from evolutionary biology. Behavioural strategies causing their bearers to produce more offspring are expected to become increasingly common, at the expense of less successful strategies. Thus strategies are predicted to gradually change over evolutionary time until an equilibrium is reached at which no further improvement is possible (Maynard Smith 1982; Hammerstein 1996) . Individuals using this equilibrium strategy can be considered rational since they consistently take the best course of action in order to maximise their reproductive success. It follows that, when evolutionary processes are at equilibrium, predictions about animal behaviour can be obtained simply by asking what is the most profitable way to behave, without considering the dynamics of the evolutionary process (Maynard Smith 1982; Alexander 1982; Parker & Maynard Smith 1990; Grafen 1991) . This greatly simplifies thinking and analysis of behavioural adaptations. Similarly, the analysis of human strategic interactions can be simplified by taking it for granted that human players are rational (Fudenberg & Tirole 1992 , Rubinstein 1998 . However, the rationality paradigm has been criticised on the ground that many constraints apply to behavioural mechanisms (Simon 1955 (Simon ,1956 Maynard Smith 1978; Gould & Lewontin 1979; Binmore 1987; Rubinstein 1998) , that adaptation takes time (Maynard Smith 1978) , and that it is not compatible with genetic mechanisms (Karlin 1975) or evolutionary dynamics (Lande 1981; Eshel 1983; Dieckmann & Law 1996) . This paper reviews a serious challenge to the rationality paradigm that emerges from studies of animal communication. This research has a long history beginning with studies of sexual selection (Darwin 1871) and mimicry (Bates 1862) during the 19 th century . Later, based on numerous comparative studies, classical ethologists established that signal evolution followed particular patterns (Lorenz 1941; Tinbergen 1952; Cullen 1966; Hinde 1970; Eibl-Eibesfeld 1975) , referred to as ritualisation (Huxley 1923 (Huxley , 1966 .
Signals evolve from existing traits and particular changes in form take place (Tinbergen 1952; Eibl-Eibesfeld 1975) . However, classical ethology never succeeded in providing a complete evolutionary explanation of ritualisation. One reason for this was that they did not recognise the evolutionary conflicts involved. The importance of such conflicts became obvious when game theory was introduced to evolutionary biology in the 1970s (Maynard Smith 1982) . Classical ethologists had also discovered supernormal stimulation, that is stimuli which elicit a stronger response than naturally occurring ones, but this finding was not linked to ritualisation. However, after the introduction of game theory it was soon recognised that such receiver bias could drive evolutionary processes in conflict situations (Staddon 1975; O'Donald 1977; Dawkins & Krebs 1978 , 1979 . To date these insights have been developed in both theoretical investigations (West-Eberhard 1979; Andersson 1980; Krebs & Dawkins 1984; Leimar et. al 1986; ten Cate & Bateson 1988; Ryan 1990; Guilford & Dawkins 1991; Endler 1992; Enquist & Arak 1993; Arak & Enquist 1995) and empirical studies (Burely 1982; Ryan et al 1990; Basolo 1990 ).
However, these works have often been overshadowed by game theoretical studies of social evolution searching for rational solutions.
In this review we elaborate on the research summarised above and conclude that it has far-reaching consequences for how we view evolution, relevant for understanding all types of behaviour in which individuals interact and the interests of the players do not fully coincide. Under these circumstances, it is more appropriate to view strategies that emerge as staging posts on the road of an evolutionary race (Dawkins & Krebs 1978) , rather than the stable end-points predicted by game theory. The evolution of traits "outof-equilibrium" may account for much of the richness observed in the social behaviour of animals as well as in human culture, such as spectacular signals and fine art, that seem to escape rational explanations.
A Problem for Game Theory
The problem of using game theory for understanding behaviour can be illustrated by a simple game between two players, an actor and a reactor. The actor is either present (v=1) or absent (v=0). The reactor, based on whether or not the actor is present, decides upon an effort x (x 0). In the presence of the actor the return on this investment to the reactor is first increasing and then decreasing with x. The benefit to the actor of the reactor's effort is ever-increasing with x. In the absence of the actor, providing an effort x>0 returns a negative payoff to the reactor. The game models a widespread type of interaction. For example, a female bird (reactor) must decide how much to invest in reproduction depending only on whether the male (actor) is present or absent in the territory.
Note that, as in most games, there is a conflict between the two players, concerning the amount of effort x to be made by the reactor. One example of such a game may be formally written as follows
where F A is the payoff to the actor and F R is the payoff to the reactor.
Since we have (deliberately) assumed that the reactor is the only player that has a choice of actions, we solve the game simply by finding the effort that maximises the reactor's payoff. If the actor is present the optimal effort is x= 0.5. Actor and reactor then receive in return 0.5 and 0.25 respectively. If the actor is absent, the optimal effort for the reactor is x = 0. This solution is a "Nash" equilibrium (no better response strategy exists; Fudenberg & Tirole 1992) and it is also evolutionary stable because if the reactor's effort drifts away from the optima of 0.5 or 0.0, selection will return it to these levels.
This game may seem so trivial as to not warrant a formal analysis. However, it nicely illustrates some of the problems of applying such games to reality, problems which we believe pervade the entire game theory approach to behaviour. First, in reality, information about the presence or absence of the actor is not automatically provided to the reactor but must be inferred from sensory input (Fig. 1) . The presence or absence of the actor is detected by a mechanism that reacts to the stimulation or physical energy (e.g. light or sound) that reaches the reactor. The actor must be recognised when present even when viewed from different distances and angles, in different light conditions and against different backgrounds.
Second, the actor may take on a variety of appearances, and because such appearances give rise to different stimulation, they may elicit quite different reactions from the reactor. In game theory, it is common to restrict, consciously or unconsciously, the number of strategies considered, e.g. by limiting the number of appearances to the minimum needed to convey the relevant information or by considering variation along a single dimension only. Furthermore, strategies available to players are prescribed in advance while evolution is an unfolding process in which new strategies become possible as a result of evolution itself. There are several reasons for making these simplifying assumptions. One is to make mathematical analysis possible. Another motive is to limit the number of solutions to the game or to eliminate those considered implausible (van Damme 1987) . However, as we shall see, these restrictions cannot always be justified from an evolutionary point of view.
A more realistic formulation
Let us now consider a more realistic formulation of the Game of Presence, in which the actor can change its appearance (by random mutation), and the reactor has one response to each such appearance (Fig. 1) . The responses are subject to change by mutation, so that over time reactors may increase or decrease their sensitivity to different appearances.
What is the outcome of such a game? In simulations, the game proved to be highly dynamic with rapid changes in actor appearances accompanied by reactor counteradaptations (Fig. 2) . In most simulations, appearances evolved that enabled actors to manipulate reactors into producing an effort x>0.5. A stable equilibrium was found only when the number of appearances available to actors was restricted to one, corresponding to the simplistic version of the game presented above. As the number of possible appearances was allowed to increase, reactors were less able to resist manipulation, and thus produced a greater effort. Note also that actors typically do not use the most effective appearance and thus also behave irrationally.
Why do reactors not evolve effective countermeasures against manipulation? This is not possible because reactor responses towards appearances not currently used by actors are neutral with respect to selection, and subject to mutations and subsequent drift. Thus, at any given time, there is a set of hypothetical, but not yet existing, appearances that would stimulate reactors to produce efforts larger than the optimum. When such appearances arise by chance mutation in the population of actors, they are strongly favoured by selection and rapidly spread (this has been referred to as sensory exploitation of receiver bias ; Basolo 1990; Ryan et al. 1990) . Selection acting on the population of reactors then tends to desensitise their mechanisms to these new appearances, restoring the effort back towards x= 0.5. However, at any time, there are likely to be new, "untested" appearances appearing in the actor population, some of which can by-pass the reactors' defence mechanisms.
In conclusion, the realistic game has a very different outcome from the simplistic model. Stable equilibria do not exist and the game resembles an evolutionary race in which at least some players behave irrationally.
Interaction instability
The above results can be generalised to all games in which there is conflict and direct interaction between players. That such games lack stability will be referred to as interaction instability. It is important to note that this instability is not a product of constraints. In the simulation above the optimal strategy is always available. Instead, it is the combined effect of temporary suboptimal responses to novel situations and the continuous emergence of new appearances or signals that causes interaction instability.
Conflict is a necessary condition for instability because when the players' interests coincide there are no incentives for manipulation. Within limits, more costly signals will evolve as the degree of the conflict between players increases (Dawkins & Krebs 1978; Krebs & Dawkins 1984; Arak & Enquist 1995) . In addition to actor-reactor conflicts, the evolution of costly signals may be driven by conflicts between two or more actors competing for the attention of reactors (Arak & Enquist 1995) .
Interaction between individuals is also a necessary condition. More specifically, decisions must be taken after observations of other players' actions (referred to as dynamic games in game theory; Fudenberg & Tirole 1992) . Whenever such actions influence the deciding player manipulation is a possibility. In contrast, games do not suffer from interaction instability if all decisions are made prior to any interactions (static games, Fudenberg & Tirole 1992 ). An example is the sex ratio game (Maynard Smith 1982) . Sex in most species is decided early in life before any interactions with other individuals have occurred, so there is no possibility for individuals to influence each other's decisions. Such clear cases may in reality be rare, but are often studied theoretically (Maynard Smith 1982 , Fudenberg & Tirole 1992 . Although we are concerned here with manipulation via the sense organs, similar principles apply to direct manipulation of the physiological machinery of other organisms. For instance, female gall wasps inject chemicals into plants causing a spherical structure to grow on the leaf that serves as a home for the wasp larvae.
The traditional aim of game theory has been to find and describe equilibria. The problem of novel strategies, which may cause games to depart from equilibrium, has been addressed in several ways. In many signalling models explicit assumptions about reactions to novel stimuli is often made such as "no reaction" (Johnstone 1995) and "same reaction as to the closest existing stimulus" (Grafen 1990 ). In classical game theory developing of new equilibrium concepts has been a major issue with the aim of limiting solutions to the most plausible ones (Selten 1975; van Damme 1987; Fudenberg & Tirole 1992) . Generally, such refinements of the Nash equilibrium are based on small departures from the equilibrium (so-called "trembles") towards which players adapt (Selten 1975; van Damme 1987; Fudenberg & Tirole 1992) . This translates into superrationality, that players behave rationally even in novel situations (Auman 1986 ).
However, neither superrationality nor the assumptions found in signalling games seem justifiable from knowledge of animals' reactions to novelty or from evolutionary theory.
Both deny the possibility of manipulation ever occurring in games.
The Importance of Mechanism
An important principle in behavioural biology is that theory about evolutionary causation (ultimate explanations) and behavioural mechanisms (proximate explanations) are two independent issues that can not replace each other (Tinbergen 1963) . The reason why something has evolved, e.g. a mate preference is not the reason why the individual (its behavioural mechanism) responds in a particular way to potential mates. However, if behaviour is rational than mechanisms become less important, since game theory alone can predict all details of behaviour. The study of mechanisms is then reduced to describing how rational behaviour is actually implemented. In contrast, if evolution proceeds out of equilibrium we need to consider mechanisms to understand both behaviour and the course of evolution (Eibl-Eibesfeld 1975; Staddon 1975; Ryan 1990; Guilford & Dawkins 1991 , Enquist & Arak 1998 . If the form of a signal is not at equilibrium (i.e. more efficient signals exist) which variants will be favoured depends on the mechanisms currently used by receivers. A crucial issue is whether mechanisms can evolve that counteract interaction instability, so that game theory predictions can be rescued.
To resolve these issues, we may first visualise the reactor's mechanism as a "look-up table" in which the response to every stimulus appears as an entry in one cell of the table.
Modelling behaviour with such a mechanism is equivalent to the approach of game theory and optimisation theory, that traditionally seek an independent, best response to each move by the opponent (Binmore 1987; Fudenberg & Tirole 1992) . Note that we already used a look-up table in the simulation of the Game of Presence above (Fig. 2 ).
Can such an idealised mechanism evolve? The answer clearly is no. One reason is that an impossibly large memory would be required. If we try to implement a look-up table based on all possible stimuli reaching the sense organs we immediately see a flaw in the idea. Suppose there are just 1000 receptors (a modest assumption in most cases) and each receptor can be in only one of two states, "on" or "off". Then there are 2 1000 possible patterns of stimulation that could be experienced, each needing its own entry in the lookup table. The problem becomes more acute if, as it is often the case, a sequence of stimuli is relevant for optimal decision making. Although in game theory such sequences are explicitly described in game trees (Fudenberg & Tirole 1992) , it is difficult to imagine how they could all be stored in memory. Estimates of the storage capacity of the human brain vary between 2 33 and 2 52 bits (Crevier 1993 The only way out of the above problems is to use a mechanism with a much coarser memory structure (fewer parameters) than a look-up table. In real mechanisms responses depend on the architecture of the nervous system and the memory stored therein. It is conceivable that each memory parameter affects responses to many stimuli, and responding to a single stimulus is governed by many parameters. Now, reactions to novel stimuli are not undetermined, but depend on the architecture and the current content of the memory. In addition, real mechanism suffers from constraints that make some responses more difficult to implement than others (Simon 1955 (Simon ,1956 Dukas 1998; Maynard Smith 1978; Stephen & Krebs 1986; Binmore 1987 ).
Evolution will favour those mechanisms that show some "intelligence" vis-à-vis reality. For instance, stimuli that are similar to one another often share some causal relationship with events in the outside world. An "intelligent" mechanism can detect and use such regularities, generalising knowledge about familiar situations to novel ones (Fig.   3 ). In addition, animals have evolved general methods to cope with novelty, including exploratory behaviour and avoidance behaviour (Russell 1973) .
Although generalisation of this kind would seem a sensible way of dealing with novelty, it will always lack precision, independent of how intelligent the organism is.
This is because novel situations can differ from familiar ones in many details that cannot always be anticipated from previous experiences. For example, if an animal that lives on a diet of berries encounters a new kind of berry (e.g. novel in colour or shape), there is usually no way of knowing whether it is edible or poisonous. In case the initial reaction is inappropriate, some evolutionary time is needed to establish the proper response.
Alternatively, individual learning, which is another aspect of intelligence (look-up tables do not learn), may be used to establish appropriate behaviour towards the novel berry. In both cases, there will be a period of sub-optimal behaviour. In the case of learning, it will never disappear since naïve individuals appear continuously in each generation.
Furthermore, a real mechanism will not treat all novel stimuli alike, but will have biases.
In our example, some new berries will be preferred over others, independent of their values as food. Some berries may be even preferred to the familiar ones (cf. Fig. 3d ).
Novelty could also be viable way of avoiding reactions. For instance, while some new appearances may increase predator attacks others might have the opposite effect (Götmark 1996; Tullberg et al. 2000) . Figure 4 shows the effect of using a more realistic mechanism, an artificial neural network, in the Game of Presence. Interaction instability is still a driving force but manipulation is now less since the network is more "intelligent" towards novel stimuli than the look-up table. However, the evolutionary consequences of intelligence are often mixed. To solve a problem with greater accuracy a more complex mechanism is usually needed. For example, eyes with more receptors allow for more accurate discrimination.
How does such increased complexity affect reactions towards novel stimuli? Are humans less susceptible to manipulation than, say, a snail? One may think that if a more complex mechanism evolves, it inevitably will be more efficient and make less sub-optimal responses than the mechanism from which it evolved. For example, one may add a biascorrecting device to the original mechanism. But also such a new mechanism will have its own biases (see Binmore 1987) . Thus, while we expect the added complexity to function well in solving currently existing problems, this does not necessarily mean that it will make the mechanism more efficient when faced with new problems. In fact, the opposite could be true since as complexity increases the number of different stimuli the organism can perceive is also likely to increase, together with the number of physiological and biochemical processes that are open to interference (Fig. 5 ). An increase in mechanism complexity may also allow qualitatively different stimulation to be effective. For example, the ability of a mechanism to recognise patterns in time may favour signals that are variable in time over monotonous repetitions of the same signal.
Outcomes of Evolution
If evolution of social behaviour proceeds out of equilibrium what phenomena will be generated? Will new phenomena arise that could not be part of an equilibrium? To answer these questions we need to consider the evolutionary dynamics in some detail. We will mainly focus on evolution between one actor and one reactor in which it pays latter to respond to the former although conflicts may occur (cf. game of presence). An example: it pays females to show some interest in males even when the conflict between the sexes is high, otherwise females could not reproduce. Such interactions are the main issue of this paper and we discuss below how they can give rise to ritualisation. Towards the end of this section we will briefly consider some other situations, including more types of players and lack of incentive for reacting.
In each generation during evolution reactors respond to actors. Variability in appearances and reactor mechanisms contributes to differential reproduction. In addition, mutations are generated in both actors and reactors. Some mutated appearances allow actors to be more successful in reproduction at the expense of the reactor. If such a new appearance becomes established reactors will counteradapt, which may lead to new reactor biases (Binmore 1987; Enquist & Arak 1998 (Dawkins & Krebs 1978; Krebs & Dawkins 1984) . Actors that can cause more beneficial responses from reactor will be favoured in evolution even if these responses are detrimental to reactors. This prediction is supported by many examples of sensory manipulation in nature, including brood parasitism in birds, Batesian mimicry, slave-making in ants and sexual mimicry in fireflies. However, in situations where it pays the rector to respond this prediction is difficult to evaluate because the optimal level of responding is unknown. Examples are begging and courtship. Furthermore, at any time in evolution the departure from rationality might be small (see e.g. Fig 5) but still drive the ritualisation process.
2. The system is not at evolutionary equilibrium (Dawkins & Krebs 1978; Arak & Enquist 1995 . Many of the predictions listed in this section also can be derived from various game theoretical models where behaviour is rational (Grafen 1990; Andersson 1994; Bradbury & Vehrencamp 1998) . A crucial difference is that these models predict equilibrium. It would be illuminating if one could determine whether actor-reactor systems are at equilibrium or not. Comparative studies may be of help by showing that related species have similar biases, but this has only been exploited by actors in some of the species. Indeed, this has been shown in several species (Basolo 1990; Ryan 1990 ). The ideal is of course to study the evolutionary process directly. The most elegant proof for out-of-equilibrium evolution in games with conflict comes from an experimental study of male-female coevolution in the fruitfly Drosophila (Rice 1996) . Males were mated with females for several generations, but only the male line was allowed to evolve (cf. Fig. 4 ). All females from the evolving male line were discarded, and the males crossed with new target females in each generation. After only 30-40 generations the evolving males were better at obtaining matings and produced more progeny than control males. But these advances were made at the expense of the females, which had higher death rates when exposed to evolving males than to controls. The conclusion of these experiments is that if one side of the arms race is not allowed to evolve, the other rapidly wins an advantage. (Dawkins & Krebs 1978; Krebs & Dawkins 1984; Vehrencamp & Bradbury 2000) . A system must evolve before it can be manipulated. This is an example of the unfolding of evolution, that new strategies become possible as a result of evolution itself. We could not expect responses to evolve unless they confer some advantage. Thus, signals can not be totally devoid of information. The peacock's plumage may be a mixture of the simple but vital message "I am a peacock male" and non-informative advertisement. This prediction is nicely illustrated in the long-tailed dance fly, a species in which males supply nutrients to the female (Funk & Tallamy 2000) . In a related species males prefer females with larger abdomen, a reliable cue of female reproductive value. However, female long-tailed dance flies are able to inflate their abdomen, thereby reducing the information content of this cue. (Darwin 1872; Cott 1940; Cullen 1966?; Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1975; Staddon 1975; Dawkins & Krebs 1978; Ryan 1990; Guilford & Dawkins 1991; Enquist & Arak 1998) . Successful appearances are those that are able to influence the nervous system of the reactor in a direction that favours the actor's reproduction.
Manipulated mechanisms have also benefits

The form of signals that evolve reflects properties of the receiver's nervous system as well as strategic factors
Thus the design of signals will at least partly reflect properties of the reactor's nervous system.
One aspect of reactor biases is that it can exert a repulsion force favouring extreme actor appearances (Fig. 3 ). Initially such a force also depends on strategic factors, e.g.
the need for discriminating the actor from other stimuli (Enquist & Arak 1998 Fig. 3 ). (Enquist & Arak 1998) . Over evolutionary time actors may accumulate modifications (following the principles outlined in the previous point) resulting in complex appearances; modifications that have allowed the actor to manipulate the reactor. This prediction is supported by the fact that it is often difficult to attach meaning to signal form (Fig 6) . This is especially true for complex signals involving modification of several different body parts, the use of many patches of colour, or different modalities of signalling, suggesting that they are highly "redundant" from the point of view of information transfer. The classical example is male sexual ornamentation such as in the birds of paradise. Other examples are: sex during infertile periods in monogamous species; nest-relief ceremonies in birds, when one partner relieves the other at the nest; spectacular and extended courtship in simultaneous hermaphrodites; prolonged grooming sessions between associated individuals in primates. (Dawkins & Krebs 1978; Arak & Enquist 1995) . In situations where players have complete common interest, signals will evolve to be efficient at the minimum cost.
Appearances and Signals evolve to which it is difficult to attach any "meaning"
As the degree of conflict increases, more costly and ornamented signals evolve
However, when it benefits the reactor to be resistant to signals, selection acting on actors will tend to exaggerate those elements of the signal that are most likely to elicit a favourable response. Simulations suggest that when the degree of conflict increases more costly ornamentation is accumulated over evolutionary time. This prediction is at odds with the classical explanation for ritualisation, which viewed this process as due to mutual interest of avoiding mistakes (Cullen 1966 
quality).
A general theory
The above predictions are just the most basic, and many issues remain to be solved about actor-reactor evolution. Above we considered situations in which the reactor has some incentive to respond to the actor. In addition, manipulation has evolved in situation in which no such incentive exists. For instance, larvae of some blue butterflies convince ants to bring them to their nest where they feed on the host larvae, and some orchids induce wasps to copulate with the flower thereby transporting pollen among flowers.
Other such phenomena are brood parasitism in birds, Batesian mimicry, sexual mimicry in fireflies. Here reactor responding is maintained by a third player or by other stimuli such as the background. This introduces attraction forces, causing a signal to become similar to other stimuli by exploiting responses that have evolved in another context, resulting in mimicry or crypsis (Cott 1940). As with repulsion, both strategic factors and reactor biases (Enquist & Arak 1998; Holmgren & Enquist 1999; Mallet & Joron 1999) contribute to such forces. In summary, the strategic interests of actors and reactors together with reactors' mechanisms can create a complex web of attraction and repulsion forces acting on signal form. Further complexity arises from individual learning (ten Cate & Bateson 1988) and from spatial dynamics (Mayr 1963; Mallet & Joron 1999) . In addition to ritualisation, mimicry and similar phenomena, interaction instability may give rise to other phenomena. Synergistic evolution of aposematic coloration is one example (Leimar et al. 1986 ).
Human Culture
The evolutionary scenarios described above may be very important for understanding human behaviour and culture. Advertisement and persuasion are phenomena that game theoreticians have had problems explaining (Rubinstein 1998). It is of course rational to try to persuade through advertising, given that it works, but why does it work? According to the rationality paradigm we should not be persuaded to do something that is not to our advantage, such as paying a higher price for a product that can be bought cheaper from a less colourful supplier. In the light of the theory reviewed above, the existence of up by transport authorities to direct traffic. These signs are informative but not highly ornamented (little conflict). In contrast, signs set up by shops, restaurants and other commercial organisations are generally bigger and contain a high degree of ornamentation that is not necessarily indicative of the quality of products or services that are being advertised (high conflict). Also predicted is the decrease in efficiency of a particular advertisement as consumers counter-adapt to its persuading effect.
Ornamentation and rituals in humans are by no means limited to commercial contexts. In fact, major parts of all cultures include creation and enjoyment of stimulation such as music, gardens, decorated homes, films, paintings, poetry and so on. At times attempts have been made to explain these phenomena as rational responses, but these have been generally unconvincing. We must remember that many cultural expressions are of very recent origin. Records of artistic culture date back hardly more than 50,000 years and many of today's art forms have been shaped during the last few hundred years. Thus, it is not plausible that our reactions to art are biological adaptations. An alternative view that emerges from this paper is that human art, in its broadest sense, is a cultural exploration of the human mind. Artists have continuously invented new ways of stimulating our senses. This process has taken place not over an evolutionary time scale, but at a very rapid pace, often during the lifespan of individual human beings. It is therefore inconceivable that countermeasures to these highly attractive, persuasive stimuli can have evolved in humans. Attempts to seek adaptive explanations for many cultural traits will be futile.
This view also offers an explanation to findings about human demography that have troubled evolutionary biologists (Borgerhoff Mulder 1988) . One is that when general standards of living improve in a country the birth rate goes down. This is referred to as the demographic transition. A related observation is that rich people tend to have fewer children. Obviously, this cannot be an adaptive behaviour in the sense of genetic evolution. An increase in material resources should lead to an increase in reproduction, not a decrease. From an abstract point of view cultural stimulation can be seen as a form of manipulation of gene-based cognitive programs that originally evolved because they increased their bearers' success in reproduction. When conditions improve not only do resources for reproduction increase but also the diversity and access to cultural stimulation. Similarly, rich families have greater access (more money) to such stimuli than poorer families. In practice, individuals will trade-off rewards from a diversity of cultural and biological activities resulting in less effort being allocated to reproduction.
In conclusion, the hypothesis that communication systems often exist "out of equilibrium" can reconcile the existence of many aspects of human culture with evolutionary thinking. Spectacular cultural phenomena can evolve that convey little meaningful information, but still have strong impact on spectators.
Conclusions
In this review we have shown that the idea of animals or humans as perfectly rational beings is sometimes difficult to justify based on evolutionary thinking and empirical evidence. Real games with conflicts and interactions will always, as one element, contain continuous evolution of "salesmanship" in actors and "sale resistance" in reactors that may produce significant departure from rationality. That manipulation is important in biological evolution is not a new idea (Haldane 1949; Futujma & Slatkin 1984; Futujma 1998; Rothstein & Robinson 1998) . However, while embracing the idea of manipulation in coevolution between different species such as parasites and hosts (Futujma 1998),
biologists have usually played down the possibility of manipulation in interactions within a species, and have instead favoured adaptive or rational explanations of behaviour.
Likewise, game theory models within economics and other human disciplines have seldom considered the possibility of manipulation and persuasion. Actor-reactor coevolution has been studied in a number of different biological contexts, but often from different perspectives. Specific theories have been developed for sexual selection, within species interactions, coevolution between different species, and host-parasite interaction at the biochemical or physiological level. We think that these evolutionary processes share significant similarities and that the differences should not be exaggerated.
Finally, although we have stressed that social traits may often persist out-ofequilibrium, it would be wrong to conclude that rational behaviour can not evolve and that game theory and optimisation theory should be abolished. In the special case when selection pressures are constant the use of optimisation theory is justified. For example, the extraordinary flight of an albatross can be satisfactorily explained in terms of "good design" relative to the particular aerodynamic circumstances at sea. Furthermore, interaction instability does not affect games with little conflict, or where players cannot influence each other's decisions. However, the majority of situations are more complex, involving some degree of conflict and interactions between players. Game theory has been successfully applied to a number of such situations, suggesting that interaction instability does not always dominate actor-reactor evolution. Clearly more work is needed to evaluate the exact evolutionary consequences of interaction instability.
Figure legends Fig. 1 The Game of Presence. The figure compares two ways of formulating the Game of Presence. In the simplistic formulation (the traditional way of formulating games), it is assumed that the reactor knows whether the actor is present or absent. In the realistic formulation the reactor must infer this information using its sense organs, discriminating the actor on the background from the background alone. Only a few of the possible appearances are shown. In reality, the number of actor as well as background appearances is infinite. Fig. 2 . Simulations of the realistic formulation of the Game of Presence. a, the average effort by reactors calculated from 10 simulations of the game. The more appearances available to actors, the greater effort they are able to elicit from reactors. Each simulation lasted 15,000 generations (average calculated on the last 10,000 generations only). The bars describe the fluctuation in effort (average SD from the 10 simulations). Simulations started at a Nash equilibrium: all actors use a particular appearance, and all reactors respond with the optimal effort x=0.5 to any actor appearance. Such equilibrium is stable only with one possible appearance, corresponding to the simplistic version of the game ( is the response to appearance i. Responses are set independently. Actor and reactor populations consisted of 100 individuals. In each generation all actors interact with all reactors leading to an expected reproduction (fitness) for each individual. Due to random factors actual reproduction is not equal to expected reproduction. Specifically, at each generation we build a new population by picking randomly 100 times an individual from the old population, with the probability of individual i being picked proportional to its fitness i.e.
. In addition, 1% of the individuals in the new populations are mutants rather than perfect copies of the parent. Actors mutated by selecting an appearance at random from the set of appearances. Reactors mutated by changing the response to one appearance, chosen at random. The new response was in turn a random number between 0 and 1 (uniform distribution). To produce b half of the appearances entailed a cost of 0.1 to the actor. Examples of responses of animals to novel variations of familiar stimuli. a, the general finding is that modified stimuli often elicit similar responses as the familiar stimulus (Pavlov 1927 , Mackintosh 1974 . This phenomenon is known as generalisation, and follows basic rules that are independent of species, context, sensory modality (Ghirlanda & Enquist in prep.). The modified stimuli are usually less effective than the familiar ones in eliciting a particular behaviour (response decreases when departing from the rewarded stimulus). Sometimes, however, novel stimuli can elicit even stronger responses (responding does not peak on the rewarded stimulus in b and c). This happens especially when intensity of stimulation is varied (b) or when animals must distinguish between two or more stimuli (c). This phenomenon has been found with respect to both innate and learned behaviour in several disciplines (Tinbergen 1951 , Hanson 1959 . Despite similarity in findings it has been referred to by a number of different names: supernormal stimulation in ethology, peak-shift and overgeneralization in psychology, and more recently receiver bias. As a whole, the data show that animals do not respond to novel stimuli in any of the idealised ways that have been considered in game theory modelling (no response, same response or a rational response). The empirical responses seem a "reasonable" way of dealing with novel stimuli, but at the same time such a general scheme of reaction (arising from the interaction of past experiences with the nervous system) cannot be optimal in any particular situation. An example of apparent biases is given in d: an oystercatcher, Haematopus ostralegus, is given a choice of what of three eggs to incubate. The smaller egg in the figure corresponds to the natural size of this species' eggs (after Tinbergen 1951) . Simulation of the Game of Presence using a three-layer neural network as the reactor (player 2). Such networks are much more realistic than look up tables and generalise spontaneously (Enquist & Arak 1998) . Diagram a and b both show how the average rector effort changes over time. The reactors optimal effort is 0.5. Shading shows when the reactor is manipulated (effort > 0.5). First actor and reactor were allowed to coevolve for 150,000 generations (both diagrams show this part). From this point the simulation was split in two. In one (a) only the actor were allowed to evolve. In the other (b) only the reactor evolved. After another 150,000 generations coevolution was again introduced. As shown some degree of manipulation is maintained during coevolution. When the reactor's evolution was stopped the actor became more efficient in manipulating. When instead the actor was stopped the reactor evolved an optimal effort. Fig. 5 . Effects of mechanism complexity on manipulation. The diagram demonstrates how varying the size of the reactor's artificial retina influences the opportunity for manipulation in an evolutionary process. On average the reactor is more manipulated when the number of receptors increases. The results are from simulations of coevolution between actors and reactors similar to those described as in Fig. 4 . Fig. 6 Stone carrying by black wheatears, Oenanthe leucura. In this monogamous species, mainly the 40-gram male carries about 1-2 kilos of stones in the presence of the female preceding each reproductive attempt (Cramp 1988 , Moreno et al. 1994 ). The ritual is repeated up to 5 times per year and often with the same female, since black wheatears seem to pair for life. The amount of stones carried correlates with reproductive success. Explanations in terms of rational behaviour hold that the amount of stones carried is a reliable signal of mate quality that is used by females to assess their partners. An alternative explanation is that stone carrying is a ritualization of nest building behaviour.
If it pays the male to reproduce earlier or at a higher rate than the female, we expect males to try to influence females' reproductive decisions. Stone carrying may have developed as an exaggeration of a cue used by the females to detect the presence of a willing male. 
